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ruce Waller is known for his work on the issues of 
free will and moral responsibility. This work is not a 
defense of his well-known position that our current 
worldview leaves no room for moral responsibility and the 
acceptance of this leaves room for a better understanding of 
freedom (see Freedom without Responsibility, 1990, and 
Against Moral Responsibility, 2011). Here, Waller 
addresses the issue of the bedrock nature of the belief in 
moral responsibility. As he states: 
 
The purpose of this book is to show that the 
deep fixity of belief in moral responsibility 
B 
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is explained by factors other than the 
existence of good reasons to believe in 
moral responsibility. The moral respons-
ibility system is stubborn, but it is not 
stubborn because it is plausible; rather, it 
seems plausible because it is stubborn (263).   
 
What makes the belief in moral responsibility so entrench-
ed that no matter the arguments against it, people are more 
likely to give up their own arguments than to give up their 
belief in moral responsibility? Why are we so quick to say 
it is absurd to deny moral responsibility even if there is no 
philosophical argument to support it? One thing to note at 
the outset is that it is not just the “folk” that Waller is 
discussing, but philosophers as well (if not more so). Why 
is the philosophical belief in moral responsibility stronger 
than the philosophical arguments for it?   
 
As with many philosophical debates there is always the 
“what do you mean by that” question. There is no shortage 
of philosophers who argue for a new conception of ‘moral 
responsibility,’ show previous conceptions to be wanting, 
and it is theirs that does the most work in establishing 
agents as morally responsible. Waller does not survey 
options in order to show that theirs are incorrect and his 
correct as one might expect. Instead he argues that in 
attempts to demonstrate there is an embedded desert-
entailment in those accounts, a move from bad to 
blameworthy, which is left unexplained. It is often taken 
that one’s being blameworthy is due to one’s actions being 
bad, but this is not blameworthiness in the sense of being 
justly deserving of blame and punishment (30). There is an 
ambiguity in ‘blameworthy’ that goes unexplored. Waller 
argues that the question is not whether one is blameworthy, 
but whether punishment/reward are justly deserved on 
nonpragmatic grounds. The stubbornness of moral 
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responsibility is rooted in the stubbornness of moral 
responsibility being a matter of just deserts.   
 
The issues, arguments, and literature that make up the 
stubbornness of just deserts moral responsibility Waller 
covers in just one book is impressive. Waller covers 
considerable ground: retributive or “strike-back” emotions; 
the connection between moral responsibility and one’s 
right to feel anger and resentment; the cognitive effects of 
the unconscious belief that the world is orderly and just; the 
belief that denying responsibility deadens our emotional 
lives; nonconscious choices; the confidence humans have 
in reason and the psychological limits on that very reason; 
the seemingly inseparable connection between freewill and 
moral responsibility; that as science proceeds it will be 
discovered that external causes account for all behavior and 
so we will excuse behavior; that the necessity of 
punishment does not entail it is justly deserved punishment; 
the neoliberal culture and its rejection of societal causal 
factors; and the narrow focus we place on the individual 
when addressing responsibility even when the causal 
factors lying beneath are more pervasive.  The belief in 
moral responsibility is tightly tangled in a big web. No 
matter how one attempts to defend moral responsibility, 
you will see how it is connected with some portion of that 
web. Ranging from philosophy to psychology to biology to 
political science, one’s interests in this issue are very likely 
covered in this book. 
 
While different chapters are going to appeal to people for 
different reasons, I will focus on topics out of two—belief 
in a just world (Chapter 4) and that investigations into the 
causes of our behavior have to be already approved by the 
system (Chapter 12).   
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The belief that the world is orderly and just has a long 
history. Much religious writing coincides with or is based 
on this belief. But religion aside, the belief that the world is 
ordered and just is necessary for a core idea in moral 
responsibility—you could have done otherwise. The world 
is structured in a way that in order to justify punishment, 
you need some power (freedom) such that you could have 
chosen otherwise in those conditions. If one could have 
done otherwise, then she can be justly praised or blamed. 
We do not need this belief to punish, we need this belief to 
justify punishment. But there is a deeper reason. At the heart 
of the belief in a just world is the belief that wrongs will be 
righted, virtues rewarded, and justice prevailing (62). While 
this is something that psychologists have studied in depth, it 
is largely absent from the philosophical literature. When we 
consciously entertain this belief we are quick to point out it 
is false, but when we look at it as a nonconscious, 
nonreflective belief, we quickly see how powerful it is. The 
belief in a just world allows humans to confront the world 
as if it is stable and orderly, as if good things will happen to 
good people and bad things to bad people. This allows 
people to avoid a feeling of helplessness (63) and also can 
provide an explanation as to why people will blame 
innocent victims when we cannot easily restore the situation 
to a state of justice (64-66). But that’s just the folk, right? 
Not so quick. Philosophers, according to Waller, are just as 
likely to hold this belief. Consciously, philosophers will 
generate counterexample after counterexample to this. 
Unconsciously, philosophers assume that the world is such 
that we can live a morally good life or meet our moral 
obligations. Even contemporary philosophers believe this 
when, for example, they rely on self-efficacy and talents. 
Thoughts of equal opportunities and moral equilibrium are 
rooted in the belief of a just world. This is not just a simple 
delusion of which we can recognize and move past, it is 
something much deeper. 
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Belief in a just world is not just an unconscious motivator, 
it is at the root of the “ought implies can” principle. 
According to Waller, accepting a non-stipulative version 
of “ought implies can” requires that one believe “all our 
moral obligations are within our power to perform” (71). 
This is a claim about our moral world. While there may be 
counterexamples to the principle, they do not weaken our 
acceptance of the principle. Why? In a just world, ought 
should imply can. It does not seem fair that there are 
things that I am morally obligated to do that I cannot do. 
If I could fulfill my obligation, then I am blameworthy for 
failing to do so; and this is simply a feature of our moral 
world. Furthermore, our acceptance of “ought implies 
can” underlies our belief that there is a “plateau” of moral 
development, a place where we are roughly equal, the 
world is fair and just (74-75). While different 
philosophers will articulate the plateau at different levels 
with different criteria, there is always the belief that the 
world is just and ordered. This puts moral responsibility 
defenders in a position where they either accept that this 
fundamental belief is problematic and accept that this 
helps undermine moral responsibility, give an account of 
how the world is in fact a just world, or show how this 
unconscious belief does not undercut moral responsibility. 
I suspect the latter more common. One might argue that 
this can be recognized and accepted into the system 
perhaps placing further limits on the plateau of moral 
development. However, by attempting to accommodate 
this one would lose the work that the belief does in the 
web. This belief lays the conceptual framework for 
judging future cases. The belief in a just world underlies 
moral judgment making not just in the present but for any 
case in which I act or evaluate others. While Waller states 
that denying the belief in a just world is a “small step” in 
rejecting moral responsibility, it is a key step.   
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In Chapter 12, Waller argues that belief in moral 
responsibility acts as a check against inquiries that might 
threaten the system. As with the belief in a just world, this 
is not a conscious belief, it is a feature that is built into the 
system itself. Moral responsibility functions by blocking 
the examination of psychological and sociological causes 
that might explain behavioral differences (235). What is 
blocked is anything that might shake our confidence in just 
deserts moral responsibility. This is illustrated in attempts 
to reject human nature, stresses, and motivations in 
criminal justice; and in attempts to defend plateau-style 
arguments where, once met, agents are moral equals. We 
are not to look for differences that challenge the system.   
 
On the face of it, this worry is not about the system of 
moral responsibility, but of the assumptions a few 
defenders make in defending it. However, it is not the 
belief itself, it is the belief in the system of argumentation 
that is being used. When Waller talks of the golden mean of 
responsibility, he is referencing a system of reflective 
equilibrium (though Waller does not talk in these terms) 
where evidence of external causes are balanced with the 
claims essential to maintaining moral responsibility. One’s 
beliefs about moral responsibility are already so entrenched 
that any evidence that there are some external causes of the 
agent’s behavior are going to be seen as throwing 
equilibrium off and as such will be ignored. Once this 
happens over time, I assume, we become habituated to 
ignore any evidence, the system will preserve itself. All 
questions of the moral responsibility system will be asked 
in terms of the preservation of the system. Any 
investigation into causes can only go as far as to lead to 
system-approved causes (251). While this is a very 
interesting argument, Waller does not give the same level 
of defense as he does throughout the book. Rather than 
demonstrating instances of it, I wished Waller had given us 
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more on the empirical literature. While more evidence may 
be desired, Waller does present an argument moral 
responsibility defenders need to take seriously.   
 
Waller has contributed a great deal with this book. Every 
chapter is a wealth of information on the philosophical as 
well as psychological, sociological, biological, etc. lit-
erature. This work also fits in exceptionally well with his 
other work on the issue of moral responsibility, but does 
not require the reader know those works. Whatever one’s 
interest in or approach to the moral responsibility debate is, 
there is a chapter you should look at and work through. 
This book is original, insightful, well-argued, and engag-
ing. I cannot recommend this book enough. 
 
